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Abstract: How can we best describe the operation of the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP), and how can we improve policy-making in CSDP? he Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC) is predicated on the conviction that there are clear limits to the extent that European 
Union (EU) foreign and security policy can be strengthened through the restricting tendencies 
of intergovernmental cooperation between EU member states. Permanent Structured Coop-
eration (PESCO) – agreed by the European Council and 25 EU member states in 2017 – ofers 
practical instruments towards delivering value-added capacity to the process of crisis manage-
ment beyond intergovernmentalism. As a process, PESCO is analogous to the logic of OMC, 
including more appropriate levels of coordination at the national organisational level in order to 
efectively facilitate the EU’s comprehensive approach to conlict prevention and crisis manage-
ment. he requirement for new and “open” types of EU foreign and security policy coordination 
is underlined by the immense diferences between EU member states in external policy, both 
concerning national crisis management structures and the resulting ineicient segmentation of 
policy at the EU level.
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Introduction
he European Union (EU) is at a signiicant crossroads. Major events mark key points in 
its history. he step change from loose economic cooperation toward a Single Market oc-
curred after the Single European Act (1986), which introduced Qualiied Majority Voting. 
he Treaty on European Union (1992) prepared for the Single Currency in 2002, with 12 
states adopting the euro. In 2004 the EU undertook its largest and most ambitious en-
largement, taking on 10 new member states.
In foreign policy, the major change has been less dramatic, but the EU’s role in this area 
has grown and may cohere to a greater extent in the future given the pressures stemming 
from international crises, of which there are many.  his paper begins with a brief survey 
of how the EU’s role in foreign and security policy has developed, and summarises the 
current state of the EU presence in foreign, security and defence policy. he contribu-
tion of this paper is to argue that the failure of the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) to fulil its ambition is unsurprising given that this would require member states 
to lead the drive towards a common EU foreign and defence policy. All EU member states 
have their own distinct foreign policy interests. Classically deined intergovernmental-
ism therefore cannot deliver a coherent common security and defence policy for the EU. 
his paper argues that post-Lisbon there has been signiicant progress in EU foreign and 
security policy through the proactive leadership and policy entrepreneurship of the High 
Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini via her management of, and engage-
ment with, multiple stakeholders including the EU’s member states.
he process governing CSDP now bears comparison with the open method of coordina-
tion (OMC), rather than classical intergovernmentalism.2 Moreover, we argue that the 
open method of coordination ofers a way forward for the Union’s common security and 
defence policy that can overcome the inbuilt resistance that has been a feature of inter-
governmental policy making in this ield. he major caveat is that it is left to the EU’s 
member states to supply the resources and political will required to deliver the objectives 
of the EU Global Strategy.3 Time is of the essence as multiple crises emerge, ranging from 
migration to terrorism, with current security frameworks turning out to be inadequate.4
OMC produces non-binding cooperation, sometimes referred to as ‘soft law’. It is not 
subject to ‘hard’ EU law that passes into the member state’s statute, so it avoids the sover-
eignty objections that attend to Community law; there is also no supranational arbitration 
and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has no role. Wallace and Reh iden-
tify key characteristics of OMC as a focus on benchmarking and the agenda setting role 
of the Commission, while policy goals and guidelines are set by the Council.5 Many stake-
2  Ekengren 2006, 89−111.
3  Menon 2016.
4  Biscop 2017a; Muller 2016, 359−374.
5  Wallace and Reh 2014, 72−112. 
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holders are involved in the policy process, and signiicant lobbying is present by various 
interest groups. Annual progress reports are submitted to the Commission by member 
states. Speciically, in the ields of defence capability enhancement and the development 
of the Union’s role in security, OMC ofers opportunities to complement measures agreed 
through Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the implementation of Capa-
bility Development Plans emanating from the European Defence Agency (EDA). OMC 
works through cooperation and benchmarking, which are the fundamental principles of 
capability enhancement. It has emerged as a useful method of work in policy areas tra-
ditionally reserved for member state competences such as employment, social protec-
tion, social inclusion, education, youth and training, through ‘sharing common objec-
tives, policy instruments, best practice and peer pressure to achieve policy convergence’.6 
Moreover, we argue that OMC ofers a means to develop deeper cooperation as PESCO 
is inally activated, bringing engagement from EU member states that are able and willing 
to cooperate more closely to mutual advantage, which could potentially lead to overall EU 
capability enhancement.
Developing an EU Security Contribution and Foreign Policy Voice
In the 1970s EC foreign policy cooperation was largely symbolic. he Commission be-
came increasingly engaged but EU member states took the lead on key issues, often pur-
suing diferent foreign policy objectives. he main EC foreign policy framework was the 
European Political Cooperation (EPC), which worked on the basis of consensus-building 
in non-contentious areas; the increasing involvement of oicials in Brussels signalled the 
beginnings of foreign policy ‘institutionalisation’.7 EPC paved the way for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was formally established by the Maastricht 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1992. Maastricht, however, consolidated CFSP as an 
intergovernmental area of policy, and this constraint to efective decision-making predi-
cated on unanimity has remained to a large extent. EPC, and then CFSP, at least ensured 
that the EU was developing an institutional role in foreign and security policy, however 
modest it may have been.  
At the Saint Malo Summit in December 1998, Britain and France set out the ambition - 
described by Howorth as a ‘Rubicon moment’8−to build ‘a (defence) capacity for autono-
mous action’.9 In 1999, the Helsinki Council made a commitment to the Headline Goals.10 
By 2003 the new High Representative for the Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, Javier 
Solana, launched the European Security Strategy (ESS), promising an EU capable of ‘early, 
6  Cini and Borragán 2016, 6.
7  Smith 2004, 11.
8  Howorth 2000a, 34.
9  Saint Malo Declaration 1998.
10  European Council 1999.
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rapid and where necessary robust intervention’11 across the full range of Petersberg Tasks, 
up to and including peace-making. In 2004 the Council committed to ‘civilian goals’ con-
sisting of a range of modalities for the setting up and deployment of multifunctional Civil-
ian Crisis Management (CCM) resources in an integrated format.12 hese were the early 
years of the EU comprehensive approach (CA) that would underpin Union engagement in 
peacekeeping and CCM through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).13 he 
transition from civilian power14 to comprehensive power was underway. 
he main weakness of the transition however came to light after 2004, with the realisa-
tion of the UK that, apart from France, no other EU member state was prepared to make 
the adequate level of commitment to EU defence co-operation. Severe under-investment 
in military hardware was accompanied by resistance in EU member states to deploying 
adequately prepared troops to military operations. Mirroring the United States’ experi-
ence of burden-sharing in the NATO, Britain and France were unable to rely on burden-
sharing in the EU. 
Since Saint Malo, CSDP has relected a lifting of the German strategic culture to the EU 
level, ‘civilianising’ the aspiration for autonomous defence.15 With more assertive German 
inluence, CSDP emphasised soft power within the CA, rather than defence capability 
and autonomy envisaged at the outset.16 Military actorness has been strictly limited. he 
intervention in Libya in 2011 by a limited number of European NATO members, led by 
Britain and France but requiring US technical support – and thereby not a CSDP opera-
tion –highlighted the continuing European capability deiciencies.
he Lisbon Treaty introduced a mechanism through which capability should have 
been signiicantly enhanced.17 PESCO was designed to enable ‘top-down guidance and 
coordination’,18 improving cooperation on an issue-by-issue basis. Groups of states able 
and willing to contribute to an initiative or combine resources could do so while oth-
ers remained outside.19 However, to be efective PESCO needs ‘real but realistic criteria, 
a permanent capability generation conference and promotion of pooling and sharing’.20 
Lisbon ofered no means to guarantee either actorness or enhanced capability, and, like 
the European Security Strategy (2003) it therefore provided no practical guidance for 
11  Solana 2003.
12  Council of the European Union 2004.
13  Major and Mölling 2013,45−62; Smith 2012; Smith 2013: 25−44.
14  Duchêne 1972, 32−47.
15  Howorth and Menon 2009,727−744. 
16  Daehnhardt 2011, 35−56.
17  Lisbon Treaty 2007.
18  Biscop 2012, 1303.
19  Witney 2008; Drent and Zandee 2010; Biscop and Coelmont 2010. 
20  Biscop and Coelmont 2010, 2; Biscop and Coelmont 2011, 149−152.
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achieving declared ends. Questions remained concerning how and to what extent states 
would pool resources, and with what reaction from those outside the participating core.21 
PESCO ought to have delivered on the European Defence Agency’s Capability Develop-
ment Plans,22 but it remained handicapped by unclear strategic objectives, no clear means 
of implementation and concerns over costs, exacerbated by inancial crisis.23 his has be-
come less a question of mere expenditure, and more of risk that the inancial crisis is di-
verting attention from the need for capability enhancement. PESCO lacked state backing, 
in terms of operational efectiveness and for capacity building.24 In four years it brought 
no obvious results,25 which is a view that is shared by former HR-VP Catherine Ash-
ton, who described member states’ appetite for PESCO as ‘limited’.26 Frustrated by lack 
of progress, British commitment to CSDP further declined. he same was true of France. 
he 2013 Livre Blanc on defence and security expressed commitment to CSDP, but also 
frustration with the low defence spending by European allies.27 hen France, too, cut its 
defence spending.28
he inancial crisis dealt a blow to defence spending across Europe. It could never be po-
litically acceptable to increase defence expenditure while making cuts in domestic policy 
ields, so defence budgets faced further reductions. he scale of commitment to CSDP, 
never considerable, was thus further reduced. Even so, CSDP is however engaged in the 
interdiction of piracy in the Gulf of Aden,29 which has been broadly successful in contain-
ing piracy along the Somali coast. It includes contributions from 20 member states.30 EU 
NAVFOR MED SOPHIA31 is the most recent military operation. It is designed to combat 
human traicking and illegal migration in the Mediterranean and assist humanitarian 
rescue. Sophia too is viewed positively, although it makes only a marginal contribution 
to the enormous challenge in confronting Europe’s refugee and asylum crisis, a situa-
tion provoked by chronic instability across the MENA and Sahel regions. To date CSDP 
has overseen 27 civilian crisis management missions. he EU has become a crisis man-
agement actor of some substance. Moreover, the EU has set up a complex institutional 
architecture presided over by the High Representative – now also Vice President of the 
Commission– supported by the European External Action Service (EEAS) launched in 
2010, which further aids missions and operations.
21  Whitman and Juncos 2009, 43−44.
22  EDA 2014.
23  Major and Mölling 2010a,11−28.
24  Biscop 2012, 1297−1313.
25  Klein and Wessels 2013, 449−470; Major and Mölling 2013,45−62.
26  Ashton 2013a.
27  Présidence de la République 2008.
28  Simòn 2013, 38−44.
29  Winn and Lewis 2017, 2113−2128.
30  EEAS 2017a.
31  EEAS 2017b.
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Common Security and Defence Policy in Times of Crisis
And yet, the ambitions signalled at Saint Malo and Helsinki have not been realised. In 
2018 the Union stands at another crossroads, perhaps its most signiicant since the East-
ern Enlargement. It is assailed by international security challenges: a resurgent and mili-
tarily aggressive Russia, where President Putin has demonstrated Moscow’s geopolitical 
priorities by backing the regime of President Bashar al-Assad against the US and its west-
ern allies. Despite sanctions Moscow has not backed down from its annexation of Crimea, 
and remains supportive of the pro-Russian insurgency in the Donbas region of Ukraine. 
his, together with the placement of missiles in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, has 
alarmed the former Soviet Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, now EU member 
states. Second, the continuing migration crisis which began following the Arab Spring in 
2011 has brought hundreds of thousands of migrants and asylum seekers to the shores of 
Europe. Upwards of 2.5 million additional people are currently in Lebanon, Jordan and 
Turkey. An EU-brokered deal with Turkey to keep migrants away from the EU’s southern 
borders has been heavily criticised and is vulnerable to the whims of Turkey’s unpredict-
able and authoritarian President, Recep Tyyip Erdoğan. EU−Turkey relations are at an 
all-time low, in spite of the migration deal, and the risk of its breaking down is real. he 
scale of the already huge crisis could become unmanageable. here is no suitable solu-
tion in sight as the fundamental causes - war, poverty and failed states across the Middle 
East/North Africa/the Horn of Africa and even the Sub-Saharan region – are not being 
addressed. A third challenge is the continuing terrorist threat present throughout Eu-
rope following the deadly attacks in several member states since 2011.32 his threat alone 
requires an upgrade in security and intelligence cooperation and although the issue of 
the UK’s presumed departure from the Union should not afect cooperation in this area, 
nothing can be taken for granted. A further developing threat concerns cyber security. 
his requires not only sophisticated trans-border cooperation, but also investment in re-
search, resources, and capability. All these threats are identiied in the European Union 
Global Strategy (EUGS) of 2016.33
A further risk factor is the mixed messages that are coming from the United States. Presi-
dent Trump began by describing NATO as an anachronism while his Special Adviser 
Stephen Bannon appeared to wish that the EU would disintegrate entirely, which would 
mean a reversal of 60 years of US diplomacy in support of European integration.34 And 
inally, there is the potential impact of Brexit, with the UK on a path to leaving the EU 
which poses a risk to CSDP and any putative EU defence capability35 as the UK remains 
the Union’s highest military spender, and France being the only other EU member state 
capable of power projection. he UK Government has reiterated its support for the exist-
32  Newsweek 2017.
33  EUGS 2016; Mogherini 2016.
34  Crowley 2017. 
35  Chalmers 2017.
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ing security structures in Europe; however, for several years it has viewed CSDP as a low 
priority and NATO as Britain’s only substantial defence interest.
So where, in this time of multiple uncertainties, does the Union sit in respect of its tradi-
tional association with civilian power,36 soft/normative power37 and its aspiration, restat-
ed in the EUGS (2016),38 to be a global security provider?39 Signiicant enabling structures 
have emerged in recent times, and as a result the Union can, and does, intervene in civilian 
crisis management (CCM). However, the pressing concern is the capability and political 
will to ensure that this process develops in line with the severity of the security challenges. 
Europe cannot continue to rely on others for its own security. In apparent recognition of 
the gravity of the challenges facing the Union, twenty-ive member states inally took ac-
tion, through the Council, to formally launch PESCO.40 he UK, perhaps unsurprisingly 
in light of the Brexit process, is not one of the 25 PESCO signatories. PESCO now has 
commitment from 25 member states and the legal authority of the Council behind it.41 It 
is accompanied by the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, which operates under the 
auspices of the Commission and uses a benchmarking approach to assess compliance of 
the members. his too can beneit from the working characteristics of the OMC based on 
looser forms of cooperation, which should suit the traditionally heavily sovereignty-based 
area of defence cooperation.
Brexit remains a potential threat to the Union’s security ambitions. Most commentators 
believe that a close security arrangement between the UK and the EU is not only desir-
able, but that it is of such fundamental importance to both that there is actually no alter-
native. Confusingly perhaps, High Representative Federica Mogherini has played down 
the importance of Brexit, saying that the UK contribution to CSDP was already slight and 
that the Union can live without the British participation. She cited the British contribu-
tion to CSDP’s civilian activities as being only three per cent, and in military operations 
only 6 per cent.42 It is surprising that she is downplaying the UK contribution; however, 
the explanation for this could be that, in defence terms, Britain’s contribution matters 
enormously and is provided through NATO, and that she is making a clear distinction 
between CSDP crisis management matters and NATO collective defence matters. In hu-
manitarian crisis management and other non-defence related security matters, the EU 
can manage without the UK or beneit only from its minimal engagement. Perhaps CSDP 
no longer intends to honour its historical commitment to the autonomous defence in 
Europe, despite continued calls from security experts, as well as Mogherini herself, to do 
36  Duchêne 1972, 32−47.
37  Manners 2002, 235–25.
38  EUGS 2016.
39  Winn 2018.
40  European Council 2017a; European Council 2017b; European Council 2017c; EEAS 2017c.
41  Biscop 2017b. 
42  Mogherini 2017a. 
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just that.43 At the same time, it is important to underline the nature of the comprehensive 
approach, wherein security depends also on economic development, as airmed by the 
HR-VP in Rome during the events organised to mark the 60th anniversary of the Treaty 
of Rome, at which she stated: “Humanitarian and development aid are also investments in 
our security … he EU must also do more on economic and social integration”.44
he EUGS (2016) argues for the consolidation of the CA.45 his is not a new ambition. he 
Petersberg Tasks, articulated in 1997, represented an early version of the CA. Two things 
happened later on, especially since the Lisbon Treaty. On the one hand, Lisbon airmed 
the intergovernmental approach underlining the primacy of member states in CFSP, even 
though in reality the bigger picture happens to be more complex. he traditional Commu-
nity method applied to the Single Market consists of Commission policy initiation, with 
the Council and Parliament legislating to align the Directives with regulations decreed by 
the Commission in areas of Community competence. Now known as ordinary legislative 
procedure (OLP) or co-decision, this has been complemented by other forms of EU gover-
nance, notably OMC, appearing in areas formerly under strict member state competence. 
Processes analogous with the OMC may also operate in common foreign and security 
policy, beneiting from the proactive diplomacy of the HR-VC and policy entrepreneurial-
ism from the Commission and other Brussels-based institutions, notably the EDA and the 
EEAS. In this context, Brexit could provide an opportunity for greater rather than lesser 
CSDP engagement, especially as in the recent years successive UK defence ministers and 
the UK political establishment generally have been lukewarm or even entirely negative 
in their approach to CSDP and any EU role in defence. Evidence of this is the agreement 
by EU ministers, after the UK referendum and without UK government participation, 
to move towards the EU Military Headquarters, and the Commission’s launch of an EU 
defence research fund.46 Previously the UK would have blocked these initiatives, but with 
the ‘awkward partner’47 out of the way there is potential for EU institutions or other inter-
ested parties (HR-VP, Commission, EEAS, EDA) to develop defence and security-related 
initiatives that may lead to common policy or further instances of pooling and sharing. 
PESCO inally promises to potentially be more efective following the Council agreement 
to activate the process in 2017.48 he HR-VP has intimated that Brexit provides an oppor-
tunity for greater Union engagement in defence.49
Developing the Comprehensive Approach: A Variant of Open Method 
43  Biscop 2015; Biscop 2017a; Zandee 2015, 105−108; Whitman 2017, 521−525; Witney 2008; 
Witney 2017; Mogherini 2016. 
44  Mogherini 2017b.
45  EUGS 2016.
46  European Commission 2016b.
47  George 1998. 
48  European Council 2017; EEAS 2017c.
49  Guardian 2016. 
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of Coordination 
Commentaries on the Lisbon Treaty anticipated the potential for the European External 
Action Service to act as a policy entrepreneur or even a fully-ledged institution50 while 
also underlining the notion that Lisbon would consolidate the comprehensive approach 
by establishing a greater role for the Commission.51
What has emerged post-Lisbon is a networked decision-making process which belies the 
notion of intergovernmentalism being the key means through which CSDP operates. In-
deed, what has emerged bears comparison with the OMC. Post-Lisbon, under the leader-
ship of the High Representative and Vice President of the Commission (HR-VP), CSDP 
represents a new variation of OMC. he EUGS (2016) provides a framework in terms 
of ambition, leadership is authored by the HR-VP herself, and there are multiple stake-
holders engaged in the process, most importantly the member states but also partner 
organisations including the African Union, United Nations and NATO, all of whom play 
some part in many CSDP missions and the overall pursuit of CSDP objectives, and all are 
referred to in the EUGS.52 EU member state involvement relects the traditional intergov-
ernmental origins of foreign and security policy, but since Lisbon the Commission be-
came an increasingly important player in CSDP processes. he Commission is the leading 
sponsor of the comprehensive approach which encompasses trade, aid and development 
as well as the staple interests of CSDP in CCM, post-conlict stabilisation, police and mili-
tary training and other development-related tasks. Central to this is the network of 141 
EU Delegations worldwide, stafed by and under the governance of the Commission, but 
also integrated within the CSDP framework.53
he Commission has assiduously developed its own role in EU security, notably through 
initiating a new defence research fund, the board of which includes representatives from 
the member states, the HR-VC, the EDA, and industrial partners. he EDA has attempted 
to provide a benchmarking dimension together with capability development plans (CDPs) 
and reports on pooling and sharing initiatives. he EDA reports on ‘cooperative capabil-
ity projects’54 including Air-to-Air Refuelling, countering Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IEDs), helicopter training, air transport, military satellites and maritime surveillance, 
while the HR and the European Council advocate joint eforts to develop unmanned air-
borne vehicles (UAVs), Air-to-Air Refuelling, satellite communications and cyber securi-
ty.55 he Council meeting in December 2013 was preceded by preparatory papers from 
50  Kaunert and Léonard 2012; Dijkstra 2012, 454−472; Biscop 2011; Crowe, 2008; Mauri and Gya 
2009, 4−10; Grässle 2011; Martin 2013; Sus 2014, 56−85.
51  Zwolski 2012a, 68−87; Zwolski 2012b, 988−205;Blockmans and Wessel 2009, 265−308.
52  EUGS 2016.
53  Ashton 2013b.
54  EDA 2013; EDA 2014.
55  Ashton 2013c.
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the HR/VP,56 the Commission57 and the European Parliament.58 hese documents suggest 
enhanced cooperation, a strengthening European strategic culture and ambition towards 
improved capability, and even actorness, deined as: ‘(the) capacity to behave actively and 
deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system’.59
EU activities under foreign and security policy increasingly relect the multiple stake-
holder nature of the Union’s commitment to regional and global security, including its 
own defence interests and those of the member states. here is an ever closer EU/NATO 
partnership, evidenced by the EUMS hosting a joint conference with NATO International 
Military Staf in November 2016, at which the need for closer collaboration between both 
was underlined, supplementing the EU/NATO Joint Declaration agreed at the margins 
of NATO’s Warsaw Summit in the summer of 2016.60 NATO itself has none of the UK’s 
reservations concerning a stronger EU role in security and defence.
he role of the EEAS is vital, not only in its support tasks underpinning operations and 
missions, but as an information and expertise provider to the PSC, the Commission, 
COREPER, and of course the HR-VP. Within the diverse and multi-agency multi-stake-
holder panoply of CSDP interests, the EEAS has become a major player (see Fig.1).
56  Ashton 2013c. 
57  European Commission 2013c.
58  European Parliament 2013. 
59  Sjöstedt 1977, 21−39.
60  European Council 2016.
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Table 1: CSDP Structures (based on ISIS, 2013)61
A notable post-Lisbon innovation within the EEAS is the Crisis Management Planning 
Directorate (CMPD) tasked with improving coordination between civilian and military 
aspects of crisis management.62 he CMPD is central to mission planning and policy im-
plementation, responsible for drafting a crisis management concept (CMC) which covers 
the political and military aspects of a crisis intervention. he military input comes from 
the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and EU Military Staf (EUMS)63 while civilian exper-
tise comes from the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM)64 
and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capabilities unit (CPCC), the latter being opera-
tional since 2007−08 and relecting the military structures already existing between the 
EUMC and EUMS.65 he CPCC is under PSC control and strategic direction, and under 
the HR-VP authority. It ensures efective planning and implementation of civilian CMOs. 
Following the advice of the EUMC and/or CIVCOM, the crisis management concept is 
negotiated in the PSC. Once agreed, it is forwarded to the Permanent Representatives 
Committee (COREPER) and the Council for approval.66
With leadership from the HR-VP and increasing institutional policy entrepreneurship, 
as well as the engagement of many stakeholders, CSDP can develop a character and an 
approach that goes well beyond dependency on member states for policy-making. he 
HR-VP is clearly set on a momentum towards greater commitment to CSDP and humani-
61  Source: Authors.
62  Gebhard 2009; Drent and Zandee 2010, 39; Stevens 2012.
63  EEAS 2016a.
64  Council Decision 2000; European Council 2000.
65  ESDP 2008.
66  Björkdahl and Strömvik 2008.
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tarian intervention. As noted above, the EEAS could potentially develop a signiicant role 
in promoting the Union as a security actor, and raising the proile of the EU and its mis-
sions under the framework of CSDP.67 It is already apparent that the HR-VP can promote 
the EU as a competent security actor, even within a highly constrained budget. he EEAS/
CSDP accounts for only around €7bn from a combined EU budget of approximately one 
hundred times that amount.
he EEAS is therefore beginning to resemble a form of supranationalism without author-
ity, since it lacks autonomous decision-making capacity. Nevertheless, the notion that 
intergovernmentalism is the sole CFSP means of policy-making is now entirely anachro-
nistic.68 he EEAS reaches far beyond the PSC and member state-controlled frameworks. 
One third of EEAS staf is Commission-appointed, although Martin (2013) considers the 
relationship between the EEAS and the Commission somewhat tetchy, partly because the 
EEAS budget is so small, just €489m in 2012, equivalent to Portugal’s development ex-
penditure or Slovenia’s defence budget,69 but typically described in Britain as ‘excessive’.70 
he Commission inally published a document deining the Commission-EEAS working 
relationship,71 but Sus concludes that its efectiveness requires all sides to act in accor-
dance with its guidelines.72 he large number of organisations in the Quality Support 
Group initiated by the Commission paper indicates the complexity of communication 
channels including representatives from the EEAS, DG DEVCO, DG ENLARG, DG 
TRADE, DG ECFIN and the EEAS for Foreign Policy Instruments.73 Various analyses 
of the genesis of the EEAS comment on its di cult beginnings marked by institutional 
rivalries between the Commission, the Council and the Parliament and between the HR-
VC and the Parliament.74 On the other hand, others note the potential for the EEAS to 
become a key policy innovator,75 especially if supplied with efective leadership. Howorth 
commented on the reluctance of member states to accept a signiicant role of the EEAS, 
coupled with an equal understanding that it could provide ‘greater policy coordination 
and coherence’.76
As the EEAS has consolidated, it appeared to contribute to supranational governance 
despite its intergovernmental foundations. his was abetted by a developing relationship 
67  Biscop 2011; Crowe, B. 2008; Grässle 2011; Martin 2013; Mauri and Gya 2009; Sus 2014, 56−85.
68  Harris 2012.
69  Martin 2013.
70  Telegraph 2013.
71  European Commission 2012. 
72  Sus 2014, 70.
73  Ibid.
74  Archick 2014; Dinan D. 2011, 103−121; Howorth 2013, 5−17; Sus 2014, 56−85.
75  Crowe 2008; Avery 2007.
76  Howorth2013, 16. 
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between the EEAS and the Parliament.77 he current HR-VP is signiicant in the emerging 
supranational contribution of the EEAS, as it consolidates bridges between the Commis-
sion and CSDP and the Council.78 he EEAS may be a beneiciary of what Beem (2009) 
refers to as ‘agency slippage’.79 his was limited under Catherine Ashton but is more evi-
dent under her successor, Federica Mogherini. he efectiveness of the EEAS is dependent 
upon the quality of its leadership, since it operates under the authority of the HR-VP.80 
In Ashton’s defence, she may have been primarily preoccupied with establishing the new 
EEAS. But Fiott speculates that the limited efectiveness of the former High Representa-
tive may relate to her being British, and that the prevailing culture of the UK political es-
tablishment restricted her freedom of action. Indeed, the House of Lords (2013) report on 
the risk of growing EEAS inluence was extremely cool.81 Mogherini, on the other hand, 
has been more proactive. he EEAS is a service provider but also an important facilitator 
of policy initiatives through its capacity to exploit multiple stakeholders and communica-
tion channels between institutions, and along with the EDA it can be an efective policy 
driver. All of this constitutes an important set of developments in CFSP. While the EEAS 
is a long way from becoming a fully-ledged institution, its inluence continues to grow 
and it could become ‘an inluential policy actor in its own right’.82
he architecture is in place for CSDP to play a growing role in EU security, and even de-
fence. As its name implies, the EEAS functions as a service organisation facilitating and 
informing mission preparation and deployment through its constituent parts, notably the 
EUMS and EUMC. Perhaps the most signiicant enabler of progress following the Lisbon 
Treaty has been the HR-VP. Lisbon enhanced the status of the High Representative, add-
ing the position of Vice President of the Commission, thus facilitating a bridge between 
intergovernmental and supranational institutions. It also gave the HR-VP responsibility 
for leading the EEAS. hese structures suit OMC, using benchmarking and stakeholder 
participation without legislative outcomes that are subject to the legal competence of the 
CJEU. A central dimension to understanding CSDP in an OMC context is the engagement 
of many stakeholders in the policy process. he multiple hats of the HR-VP seemed at irst 
to constitute a weakness,83 but perhaps they have turned out to be a strength especially 
given Federica Mogherini’s proactive and energetic leadership. She is also Head of the 
EDA, and has direct channels to state ambassadors in the Political and Security Com-
mittee. Having the EEAS at her disposal also means that she can proit from consider-
able expertise and common ambition throughout the CSDP secretariat. Lisbon set up a 
policy-making architecture that can complement institutional channels as well as work-
77  Archick 2014; Martin 2013; Mix 2013. 
78  Klein and Wessels 2013, 449−470.
79  Beem 2009, 497−519.
80  European Council 2010. 
81  House of Lords 2013.
82  Wallace and Reh 2014, 82.
83  Allen and Smith 2011: 209−230; Dinan 2011,103−121; Grässle 2011; Howorth2014.
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ing through conventional intergovernmental processes where crisis intervention is con-
cerned in national, foreign ministries, the PSC and COREPER, as well as agenda-setting 
by the European Council.  
he Council set key goals at the June 2013 Council84 and again two years later,85 requiring 
the HR-VP to draw up an EU Global Strategy, which was implemented in June 2016 im-
mediately after the Brexit referendum.86 It barely mentioned Brexit, its clear intention be-
ing to airm that integration should continue. he HR-VP and the EEAS are also decisive 
in securing incremental improvements to CSDP implementation, using a ‘lessons learned’ 
approach and attempting to push member states towards enhanced ambition and capabil-
ity. In this respect, the key benchmark provider is the EDA and its Capability Develop-
ment Plans. A step-change for CSDP occurred at the end of 2016 with the adoption by the 
Commission of the European Defence Action Plan.87 his shows the growing engagement 
of the supranational Commission in a traditionally intergovernmental policy ield.
Impediments to an efective CSDP and the limited nature of the transition from civilian 
power to a comprehensive power were rooted in the dominance of intergovernmental-
ism. Any member state could exercise a de-facto veto, and the UK was indeed inclined 
to use this, as it did in blocking the creation of an EU military headquarters. Freed from 
the constraints imposed by London, the EU Council took steps towards creating an EU 
military command in December 2016, agreeing to set up a Military Planning and Con-
duct Capabilities Unit, with control of some missions including training troops in Mali, 
Somalia and the Central African Republic.88 In addition, without the risk of a British veto, 
throughout 2017 the Council airmed further steps in security and defence cooperation, 
including the potential implementation of PESCO to deepen security cooperation and de-
fence engagement, which was conirmed by 25 member states at the December Council.89
Activating PESCO will push the question of capability and political will to the fore. he 
Union stands at another crossroads, but agreement to activate PESCO signals a fresh 
commitment. New challenges may emerge. How would PESCO respond to security crises 
that demand a defence capability, including ire-ighting in a situation of armed conlict, 
for example a putative outbreak of violence in Bosnia, or Kosovo? here has been no 
armed violence in either theatre since the EU interventions under CSDP in 2004 and 
2008 respectively, but the risk has not dissipated. It is assumed that the EU could and 
surely would deploy a Battlegroup, the latter operational since 2007 but never deployed. 
Launching a Battlegroup would be a highly signiicant development of CSDP. How would 
84  European Council 2013.
85  European Council 2015.
86  Mogherini 2016.
87  EEAS 2016b.
88  Barigazzi 2017. 
89  European Council 2017a; European Council 2017b; European Council 2017c.
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the Union respond in the event of a direct threat to the territorial integrity of Estonia, 
Latvia or Lithuania? Biscop is adamant that relying on the US or NATO is fast disappear-
ing as an option and says it is high time that member states stepped up to the plate and 
prepared for their own defence.90 Europe, however,  still relies on the Atlantic Alliance 
to guarantee its collective defence and this empirical fact will not change soon. Any EU 
defence arrangements are subservient and yet also complementary to NATO enhancing 
the capabilities of the latter.
he defence relationship between NATO and the EU is undergoing development. Mem-
ber states have consistently airmed that the objective of EU defence capabilities is to 
support CSDP and not to compete with or duplicate NATO resources. PESCO is designed 
to meet security challenges, but also to make EU capacities available to NATO or the 
UN.91 he time for reticence in defence cooperation may be passing. EU member states 
are taking steps to enhance European capability separately under CSDP, but also in sup-
port of NATO. European members of the Alliance ought to constitute an adequate armed 
capability to deter aggression against any EU or NATO member state. his requires a 
substantial capability upgrade to give European members the capacity to undertake mili-
tary action independent of the US. he UK has repeatedly conirmed its commitment to 
European defence, although it is not party to the PESCO initiative of 2017.92
Enhancement of capability does not simply require increased spending. On the contrary, 
more intelligent and better targeted spending can achieve signiicant capability enhance-
ments. In times of austerity, higher spending is politically unpalatable. Nevertheless, in-
creasing capability will require expanded budgets. Key to the Union’s development of de-
fence capability is efective coordination and partnership with NATO precisely to avoid 
competition, or duplication. An enhanced EU capability ought to beneit NATO and sat-
isfy the interests of non-EU members of NATO, especially its major contributor, the USA, 
and its second most signiicant member, the UK. 
Current EU engagement in CSDP suggests the EU is already well beyond being merely a 
civilian power, although most CSDP activity is civilian-oriented. he focus of attention in 
CSDP is conlict prevention in Europe’s near abroad and civilian crisis management. he 
current military engagement of CSDP consists of operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
EUFOR Althea, of the coast of Somalia EU NAVFOR ATALANTA, and the humanitarian 
naval rescue operation in the Mediterranean, EU NAVFOR MED SOPHIA.93 he design 
and aims of the latter operation match the comprehensive ambitions of CSDP and the 
EUGS. According to the EEAS:
90  Biscop 2017a.
91  EEAS 2017c. 
92  Ministry of Defence 2017; UK Government 2017.
93  EEAS 2017b.
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EUNAVFOR MED operation Sophia is but one element of a broader EU comprehensive re-
sponse to the migration issue, which seeks to address not only its physical component, but 
also its root causes as well including conlict, poverty, climate change and persecution.94
But critics of CSDP say its impact and capability remain marginal and do not alter the 
general truth that many EU member states still relect a ‘peace dividend’ mentality 
that arose following the end of the Cold War, and a tendency to acquiesce in a strate-
gic culture that is barely strategic at all. In some member states a paciist and purely 
civilian mindset remains dominant. he former US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates 
criticised the European NATO members for failing to meet their NATO obligations.95 
President Trump repeated the same message in his Presidential campaign in 2016, 
while in April 2017 a Veterans for Britain report in the UK described European forces 
as ‘threadbare’ and woefully under-prepared for facing a military and security crisis.96 
he same organisation, which is vehemently anti-EU/Eurosceptic, has previously con-
demned the European Commission for wanting a much stronger EU defence.97 Former 
British defence Secretary Sir Michael Fallon and his US counterpart General James 
Mattis also condemned EU partners for not meeting the two per cent of GDP threshold 
indicated for defence spending. Only ive European NATO members comply with this 
level.
Conclusion
his paper has argued that CSDP, despite its evident deiciencies in terms of member 
state commitment and limited resources, has made signiicant institutional gains since 
the Lisbon Treaty. he structures that now exist, centred around the HR/VP and the 
EEAS, demonstrate a complex network of engagement that reaches across supranational 
and intergovernmental institutions, while also incorporating important relationships 
with external stakeholders, including industry and other international institutions, as 
well as EU member states. he EEAS bureaucracy, populated by technocratic and re-
gional experts, has also developed apace, and recent developments, especially following 
the UK’s apparent decision to leave the European Union, suggest greater interest in a 
more coherent common security and defence policy. A striking change appears to be 
taking place. In a policy ield formerly exclusively dominated by member state govern-
ments, the post-intergovernmental network and stakeholder involvement that is now 
apparent begins to relect not pure intergovernmentalism, but a form of OMC, whereby 
states are beginning to recognise the beneits of cooperation involving EU institutional 
actors, including the HR-VP, EEAS and the Commission. Together with the European 
Council’s commitment to activate PESCO, this is a striking change that is likely to 
94  Ibid.
95  Gates 2011.
96  Veterans for Britain 2017a.
97  Veterans for Britain 2017b.
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develop further in future. he one major caveat remains that resourcing and political 
will must always come from the EU’s member states. In this respect, they still ‘call the 
shots’ in EU foreign and security policy, even within the context of enhanced forms of 
cooperation deined by OMC.
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